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ABSTRACT 
 
This research aims at examining market reaction to Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover 
announcements using trading volume approach. The sample of this research consists of 67 CEO 
turnover announcements without confounding effects and 117 CEO turnover announcements with 
confounding effects during the period 1992-2003 from Indonesian Stock Exchange. The authors 
use a t-test to examine the hypotheses. The results for market reaction to CEO turnover 
announcements using sample firms without confounding effect show that the trading volume 
before and after the CEO turnover announcements is not significantly different. In contrast, the 
trading volume before and after the CEO turnover for sample with confounding effect is 
significantly different. The results show that Indonesian investors consider other confounding 
events along with the CEO turnover announcements to make investment decisions. Analysis is also 
conducted to examine the influence of the succession process and the origin of the new CEO on 
the market reaction toward CEO turnover announcements. We do not find significant difference 
between the trading volumes before and after the CEO turnover announcement without 
confounding effect under both organizational contexts. On the other hand, we find significant 
difference between the trading volumes for non-routine CEO turnover announcements with 
confounding effects. This suggests that non-routine CEO turnover contains useful information to 
investors. In addition, significant difference in the trading volume between before and after non-
routine CEO turnover with outside successors implies that Indonesian investors expect the 
incoming CEO from the outside to improve the performance of the company after the turnover 
process.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
his research aims at examining market reaction to Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover. Based on 
the efficient market hypothesis (EMH) theory (Fama, 1970), CEO turnover announcement is an 
event that contains useful information to the investors (Foster, 1986). It is argued that CEO turnover 
announcements convey good news if the event is in line with shareholders’ interests. On the other hand, it conveys 
bad news if the firm performance is poorer than the expectation. Empirical evidence on the market reaction to CEO 
turnover provides mixed results. There is evidence of positive reaction (Dahya & McConnell, 2005; Denis & Denis, 
1995; Huson, Malatesta, & Parrino, 2004), negative reaction (Dedman & Lin, 2002; Suchard, Singh, & Barr, 2001), 
and insignificant reaction (Reinganum, 1985; Warner, Watts, & Wruck, 1988). As CEO turnover contains mixed 
signals - both good and bad news (Warner, et al., 1988) - the inconsistent results could be due to mixed signals from 
the CEO turnover. In other words, market reaction is the sum of positive reaction to good news and negative 
reaction to bad news. 
 
 
T 
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 Most previous research that applied the event study approach to examine how markets reacted to CEO 
turnover announcements did not include CEO turnover announcements with confounding effect. However, Graffin, 
Carpenter, and Boivie (2011) argued and found that the CEO turnover announcements, as well as other corporate 
actions/announcements made during the succession, are inter-related. They suggested that both CEO turnover 
announcements with and without confounding effect should be taken into consideration in an attempt to analyze 
how markets react to the announcements. Dedman and Lin (2002), using samples with and without confounding 
effect, found that the UK markets reacted negatively to CEO turnover announcements. The result is robust and they 
concluded that the UK investors perceived such announcements as bad news. It is noted that the majority of previous 
research on market reactions to CEO turnover was conducted in Western developed countries. In Asia, research on 
market reactions to CEO turnover conducted by Kang and Shivdasani (1995) in Japan and Setiawan (2008) in 
Indonesia reported positive abnormal returns. This means that the markets perceive CEO succession as a change to 
be followed by improvement of a firm’s performance, or good news; therefore, the markets reacted positively.  
 
 The present study attempts to enhance the understanding of how investors react to CEO turnover 
announcements in an emerging country; namely, Indonesia, by analyzing CEO turnover announcements with and 
without confounding effects. Research found that some companies intentionally release other corporate actions 
simultaneously along with the CEO turnover announcement (Graffin, et al., 2011). As an emerging market, 
Indonesia is characterized as a market with concentrated ownership structures, which gives rise to a different aspect 
of agency problems as compared to developed countries. Due to highly concentrated ownership, it is argued that the 
minority shareholders are more prone to be exploited by the major shareholders. Hence, it is important to investigate 
how markets react to announcements of CEO turnover with and without confounding effect. In addition, Indonesia 
implements a two-tier board system, which means that there are two boards – the board of directors and the board of 
commissioners. The board of directors is responsible for managing the operations of the firm, while the role of the 
board of commissioners is to supervise the board of directors. The CEO is the chairperson of the board of directors 
and CEO duality is not allowed in Indonesia. As pointed out by Friedman and Singh (1989), organizational context 
and organizational content affect market reactions toward CEO turnover announcements.  We believe that the 
different institutional context of Indonesia will provide further insight to understand the relations between market 
reaction to CEO turnover announcements and hence, enrich the literature.  
 
This study will first examine the market reaction to CEO turnover to announcements with confounding 
effect and without confounding effect. Then we will consider the origin of the successor (insider or outsider) and the 
turnover process (routine or non-routine) to analyze the reaction of investors to CEO turnover announcements. In 
order to study the effects of the competing signals from CEO turnover announcements, Cools and van Praag (2007) 
suggest to analyze the trading volume around the CEO turnover announcements. Therefore, this research uses a 
trading volume approach to examine market reaction. The trading volume approach analyzes the volume of 
transactions around the CEO turnover announcement.  
 
LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
 
 Research on CEO turnover has attracted great attention as the CEO is the key person who leads a firm to 
compete in the market and plays an important role in determining the strategy and performance of the firm. If the 
leadership of the CEO fails to further improve the firm’s performance and instead lets the firm suffer from 
prolonged poor performance, he/she will be scrutinized by the internal and external control mechanisms of the firm 
and is most likely to be dismissed.  
 
 Foster (1986) argues that CEO turnover contains useful information. This implies that market will react to 
the release of such news. Empirically, Weisbach (1988), Denis and Denis (1995) and Huson, Malatesta and Parrino 
(2004) found positive market reactions to CEO turnover announcements in the U.S. On the other hand, Reinganum 
(1985) and Warner, et al. (1988) did not find significant market reactions. In the UK, researchers also reported 
mixed results. Dahyaa and McConnel (2005) showed there is evidence that markets reacted favorably to CEO 
turnover announcements and found positive abnormal returns around the CEO turnover announcements. On the 
other hand, the results of the study conducted by Singh and Barr (2001), using Australian data, reported negative 
reactions and they concluded that investors in Australia perceived CEO turnover as bad news. 
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Dedman and Lin (2002) investigated the relations between CEO turnover processes and the market reaction 
in the UK. Their sample consisted of 24 fired turnovers, 28 voluntary sign offs, 22 normal turnovers, and 10 CEOs 
who moved to other firms. Their study showed that markets reacted negatively to fired turnovers, voluntary sign 
offs, and those who moved to other firms. This suggested that the UK investors perceive CEO turnovers as bad 
news. As an attempt to conceal the bad news arising from the CEO turnover announcements, companies 
intentionally announced other good news along with the CEO turnover announcements. The result is robust as the 
investors still reacted negatively to the announcement of CEO turnovers, even with the presence of confounding 
events. 
 
In the emerging markets, Setiawan (2008) investigated how Indonesian investors reacted to the CEO 
turnover announcements using abnormal return. The result of his study showed that markets reacted positively to the 
announcements, which means that Indonesian investors perceive CEO turnover announcements as good news. In an 
earlier study, Setiawan (2007) did not find significant security return variance around the CEO turnover 
announcements in Indonesia.  
 
Lako (2002) argued that the main weakness of most empirical studies regarding market reactions to 
earnings announcements is the failure to take into account the confounding effects that have occurred around the 
earnings announcements. As a result, research on market reaction to earnings announcements produced inconsistent 
results. Lako (2002) also argued that the existence of confounding events may have a significant effect on the stock 
price and trading volume. He found that markets reacted differently to negative earnings announcements between 
samples with confounding effects and samples without confounding effects for the 1998 period. This result implies 
that the impact of confounding effects on market reaction to CEO turnover or other useful information should also 
be taken into consideration  
 
Graffin, et al. (2011) investigated companies’ strategies around the succession of CEOs in the US. They 
found that information about other corporate actions is simultaneously released along with CEO turnover 
announcements among the firms. They referred such phenomenon as strategic noise around CEO turnover. As CEO 
turnover announcements were associated with other confounding events, they suggested that future research on CEO 
turnover using an event study approach should include both confounding and non confounding effects. 
 
Cools and van Praag (2007) investigated market reactions to top executive turnover announcements in the 
Netherlands. Their sample consisted of 343 executive departures during 1991-1999. They used stock price 
movement and trading volume approaches to measure market reaction.  Their findings showed that there is no 
significant abnormal return around the announcements of top executive turnovers. Their result supported Warner, et 
al. (1988). They further claimed that the insignificant result was due to mixed reactions among investors. To 
overcome the problem, they analyzed trading volume during the succession announcement. They then found 
significant trading activity around the announcements and concluded that the Netherlands’ investors reacted to the 
top executive turnover announcements. Based on the discussion presented above, the first hypothesis of this study is: 
 
H01:  There is no difference between the trading volumes before and after CEO turnover announcements. 
 
Market Reaction to Routine and Non-routine Turnover 
 
CEO succession could be a routine or non-routine process. Denis and Denis (1995) investigated the effects 
of the routine and non-routine processes on CEO turnover. They examined 69 CEO turnovers. The results showed 
that investors reacted positively to both non-routine and routine CEO turnovers with 2.5% and 0.61% change in the 
abnormal return, respectively. They also found that investors’ reactions to non-routine change are larger under the 
normal CEO transitions. 
 
 Neumann and Voetmann (2005) investigated market reactions to CEO turnover announcements in 
Denmark. Their sample consisted of 39 non-routine changes and 42 voluntarily changes for the period of 1994-
1998. The results of their research showed that markets reacted positively to non-routine changes, but negatively to 
routine changes. This suggests that Denmark's investors reacted more favorably to non-routine changes as compared 
to routine changes. Dherment-Ferere and Reneboog (2002), using data of France's companies, supported the results 
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of Neumann and Voetmann (2005).  Dedman and Lin (2002) investigated the effects of CEO turnovers on market 
reactions in the UK. They showed that markets react negatively to the processes of being fired, voluntarily signed 
off, and moving to other firms. Based on the above findings and observations, the hypothesis to test for routine and 
non-routine CEO turnover is: 
 
H02: There is no difference between the trading volumes for routine (non-routine) CEO turnovers before and 
after CEO turnover announcements. 
 
Market Reaction to Inside and Outside CEO Turnover 
 
 Another important factor that affects investors’ reactions toward CEO turnover announcements is the origin 
of the successor; i.e., inside or outside the firm. Dherment-Ferere and Reneboog (2002) argued that the advantages 
of incoming CEOs from inside the firm are:  1)  he/she has a better vision and understanding about the firm’s 
internal condition, product, market, competition with the rivals, and relationship with the clients and 2) he/she has a 
better social network, thus he/she can get specific information more readily. On the other hand, they argued that 
incoming CEOs from outside the firm are able to maintain the corporate image, especially when the firms are under 
financial distress or suffer from poor performance. Another advantage from the appointment of an outside CEO is 
that he/she will bring a new vision to the firm and a new passion to reach a better position in the market. 
 
 Boards of directors tend to choose successor candidates from outside when the firm has a poor performance 
(Farrel and Whidbee, 2003). It is argued that if the board chooses an internal candidate when the firm suffered from 
poor performance, it would further deteriorate the firm’s image as the internal candidate is perceived to be jointly 
responsible for the poor performance of the firm.  
 
 Worrel, Davidson III and Glascock (1993) found that outside CEOs increase stockholders’ wealth, but 
inside CEOs did not show a similar outcome. On the other hand, the research conducted by Dahya and McConnell 
(2005) and Kang and Shivdasani (1996) showed that investors reacted positively to the successors of both origins; 
i.e., inside and outside. However, markets reacted more favorably to outside CEOs as compared to inside CEOs. 
Charitou, Patis, and Vlittis (2010) also found positive market reactions to the announcement of outside incoming 
CEOs in the US. This result shows the market perceives that outside incoming CEOs bring positive influences to the 
firms’ performances. On the other hand, Dherment-Ferere and Reneboog (2002) did not find significant market 
reactions to both origins (i.e., inside and outside incoming CEOs) of the successor. This means the market did not 
react to the action of hiring an outside CEO when a firm suffered from poor performance. Similarly, when the firm 
achieved good performance and hired an inside CEO to maintain the existing conditions, investors did not react to 
such action. In conclusion, Dherment-Ferere and Reneboog (2002) found that the market perceived CEO turnover as 
not having useful information content.   
 
 Based on literature review that shows inconsistent results about market reactions to CEO turnover 
announcements regarding the origin of the successor from inside and outside the firm (Dahya & McConnell, 2005; 
Dherment-Ferere & Renneboog, 2002; Kang & Shivdasani, 1996; Worrel, et al., 1993), the following hypothesis is 
formulated: 
 
H03: There is no difference between the trading volumes for inside (outside) incoming CEOs before and after 
CEO turnover announcements. 
 
Market Reaction to Routine (Non-routine)/Inside (Outside) CEO Turnover Announcement 
 
The present study also attempts to analyze market reactions to CEO turnover announcements by examining 
a combination of the organizational factors - routine turnover with inside incoming CEO, routine turnover with 
outside incoming CEO, non-routine turnover with inside incoming CEO, and non-routine turnover with outside 
incoming CEO. 
 
Kang and Shivdasani (1996) investigated the combining effect of the organizational factors on the market 
reactions to CEO turnovers in Japan. They found interesting results – that markets reacted to CEO turnover 
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announcements when the process was non-routine and involved the promotion of an outside candidate. The results 
suggested that Japanese investors perceive that non-routine processes are associated with a new leadership style that 
differs from the former CEO. Therefore a more suitable candidate should come from outside the organization. Kang 
and Shivdasani (1996) also found a positive abnormal return around non-routine outside CEO turnovers.  
 
When inside candidates were appointed as the CEO under a non-routine turnover, the market did not react. 
This is because as an inside candidate, the new CEO is perceived to be jointly responsible for the poor performance 
of the firm. In addition, it is also believed that he/she will follow a similar approach or management style of the 
former CEO in leading the firm.  
 
On the other hand, investors appreciate the inside candidate if the turnover process is routine.  The findings 
showed that markets reacted positively to routine-inside CEO changes. It is argued that inside candidates would be 
able to continue with the same management strategy to defend the firm’s market position. Clayton, Hartzell and 
Rosenberg (2005) argued that an inside CEO has a better understanding of a firm’s business conditions, thus he/she 
can lead the firm with a similar strategy. They also found that the market did not react to outside candidates if the 
process is routine.  
 
Setiawan (2007) found significant return variance for routine-inside and non-routine-outside turnover 
among Indonesian firms. The results showed that Indonesian investors reacted to non-routine turnovers when the 
successor was appointed from outside the firm. On the other hand, they reacted to routine turnovers when the 
successor was an internal candidate. Setiawan (2008) found positive abnormal return for routine-inside turnover. 
Meanwhile, Indonesian investors reacted negatively to routine-outside CEO turnover. This result showed that 
Indonesian investors prefer an inside incoming CEO when the succession process is normal. Based on literature 
review, the following hypothesis will be tested: 
 
H04: There is no difference between the trading volumes before and after routine (non-routine) inside (outside) 
CEO turnover announcements. 
 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 This research applies an event study approach. The objective of the event study is to test the trading volume 
before and after a specific event; namely, the CEO turnover announcements. The CEO turnover announcements are 
classified into two groups - announcements with and without confounding effects. One with confounding effects 
refers to announcements of other corporate actions/activities, such as dividend declarations, bonus shares, stock 
split, merger and acquisition, and right issues during a specified window period. The window period is 21 days and 
41 days around the CEO turnover announcement. The hypotheses are tested by using a t-test. The sample of this 
research consists of Indonesian-listed firms with observations collected from January 1, 1992 to December 31, 2003.  
 
The Chief Executive Officer refers to the top position of the firm, also known in Bahasa Indonesia 
(Indonesian language) as Direktur Utama and Presiden Direktur. The CEO turnover process can be identified as 
routine and non-routine. Routine change is a well planned and well structured process, while the non-routine process 
is unstructure. This research looks for related articles about CEO turnovers in the national newspapers, including 
Neraca, Kompas, and Business News, in order to determine the CEO change process (routine or non-routine). If 
related articles are not available, the authors follow Kang and Shivdasani (1996) to identify the succession process. 
According to Kang and Shivdasani (1996), if the departing CEOs is appointed as the chairperson or a member of the 
Board of Commissioners, the succession process is considered non-routine. However, if the departing CEO does not 
become a member or the chairperson of the Board of Commissioners, the succession process is considered non-
routine. The origin of CEO is classified as having inside and outside changes. An inside CEO change is defined as a 
person who works for a minimum of three years in the firm as an employee or if the person has a family relation 
with the outgoing CEO. 
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ANALYSIS 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 
The total number of CEO turnover announcements is 117. There are 50 announcements with confounding 
effects and 67 without confounding effects. The confounding events consist of 43 dividend announcements, three 
bonus share announcements, two stock split announcements, one right issue announcement, and one M&A 
announcement. The descriptive statistics show that most of the confounding effects are the announcements of 
dividend declaration. 
 
Overall, the number of non-routine CEO turnover is greater than routine turnover. There are 62 non-routine 
versus 55 routine processes for CEO turnover announcements with confounding effects and 42 compared to 25 for 
CEO turnovers without confounding effects. The authors also found that most of the successors are from inside the 
firm rather than from the outside, there are 62 inside CEO compared to 55 outside CEO turnovers for CEO turnover 
announcements with confounding effects and 35 inside CEO turnovers compared to 32 outside CEO turnovers for 
CEO turnover announcements without confounding effects.  
 
Interestingly, when the authors combine the turnover factors; i.e., the process and origin of the successor, it 
is noted that most of the events “match”. Specifically, if the CEO turnover is routine, the successors are likely to 
come from inside the firms. A routine CEO turnover means the succession is normal; therefore, the firms prefer to 
choose the successor from inside the firm. As the inside CEO is well versed in the firm’s business strategy, he/she 
does not need to take much effort to adapt to the environment. However, if the CEO turnover process is non-routine, 
the successor is likely to be appointed from outside the firm. This indicates that if the CEO turnover process is non-
routine, the firm needs a new management approach and thus, an outside CEO is preferred over an inside CEO.  
 
Market Reaction to CEO Turnover Announcements with Confounding Effect 
 
 This section discusses market reactions to CEO turnover announcements with confounding effects. 
 
 
Table 1:  Market Reaction to CEO Turnover Announcements with Confounding Effects 
Sample 
T-test for trading volume 10 days 
before compare to trading volume 10 
days after the announcements 
T-test for trading volume 20 days 
before compare to trading volume 20 
days after the announcements 
All firms 1,601 1,775* 
Routine CEO turnover 0,955 1,067 
Non-routine CEO turnover 1,396 1,798* 
Inside CEO Turnover 1,184 1,331 
Outside CEO Turnover 1,073 1,252 
Routine inside CEO Turnover 1,236 1,298 
Routine outside CEO Turnover -0,704 -0,964 
Non-routine inside CEO turnover -0,174 0,367 
Non-routine outside CEO turnover 1,49 1,779* 
Significant at 10% 
 
 
 From Table 1, the t-test for trading volume during the period of 21 days around the CEO turnover 
announcements does not find a significant difference between the trading volume 10 days before and 10 days after 
the announcements for the sample firms. These results show that investors do not use information about CEO 
turnover announcements to make investment decisions. 
 
When the authors analyze the turnover process - routine and non-routine - there is no difference between 
the trading volume before and after the announcements. The authors also find the same results in the analysis of the 
origin of successor - inside and outside the firm. There is no difference between the trading volume before and after 
the announcements. The subsequent test is to analyze the combination of the turnover process and the origin of the 
successor. Again, the authors do not find a significant difference between the trading volume before and after CEO 
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turnover announcements for routine inside turnover, routine outside, non-routine inside turnover, and non-routine 
outside. The test results derived from all the hypotheses on the trading volume 10 days before and 10 days after the 
CEO turnover announcements show that there is no difference in the trading volume within the time period under 
investigation. 
 
The test results on the difference between the trading volume 20 days before and 20 days after the CEO 
turnover announcements (41 days around the announcements) show that the market reacts to the events. The t-value 
of the difference between trading volume for all samples is 1.775 (significant at 10%). This result rejects the null 
hypothesis and accepts the alternative hypothesis. This suggests that there is difference between the trading volume 
before and after CEO turnover announcements. This result also confirms that CEO turnover announcements have 
information content which prompted investors to react. The result supports Setiawan (2008) who found positive 
reactions around the CEO turnover announcements as indicated by a positive abnormal return. 
 
The results of market reaction to CEO turnover announcements by considering the turnover process show 
that there is a difference between the trading volume before and after the non-routine turnover process; however, 
there is no difference between the trading volume before and after the routine CEO turnover process. This suggests 
that the announcement of non-routine CEO turnover contains useful information to the investors. Table 1 shows that 
markets do not react to the origin of CEO successors. There is no difference between the trading volume before and 
after inside and outside CEO turnover. These results show that Indonesian investors do not consider the origin of the 
successor in their investment decision. However, when the authors consider both contextual factors, the findings 
indicate that the outside successor has information content when the turnover process is non-routine. 
 
This result is interesting as non-routine turnovers usually take place when there are problems in the firm. 
As discussed in the literature, when a firm suffers from poor performance, the board’s decision to elect an internal 
candidate as the new CEO would make the firm’s image even more negative as the newly appointed internal 
candidate is considered responsible for the firm’s poor performance. On the other hand, an outside CEO is perceived 
to bring a new vision to the firm and a passion to reach a better position in the market. Therefore, a successor who 
comes from outside is preferable. Farrel and Whidbee (2003) also argued that the board tends to choose outside 
candidates when the firms have a poor performance.  
 
Market Reaction to CEO Turnover Announcements without Confounding Effects 
 
 This section discusses market reactions to the CEO turnover announcements using sample without 
confounding effects. 
 
 
Table 2:  Market Reaction to CEO Turnover Announcements without Confounding Effects 
Samples 
T-test for trading volume 10 days 
before compare to trading volume 
10 days after the announcements 
T-test for trading volume 20 days 
before compare to trading volume 20 
days after the announcements 
All samples 0,699 0,842 
Routine CEO turnover -0,386 -0,397 
Non-routine CEO turnover 1,038 1,276 
Inside CEO Turnover 0,268 0,405 
Outside CEO Turnover 0,642 0,733 
Routine inside CEO Turnover 0,316 0,273 
Routine outside CEO Turnover -0,951 -1,463 
Non-routine inside CEO turnover -0,031 0,337 
Non-routine outside CEO turnover 1,071 1,216 
 
 
 From Table 2, the results show that there is no significant difference between the trading volume 10 days 
before and 10 days after the CEO turnover for all samples. This result shows that the market does not react to CEO 
turnover announcements. The following analysis examines how markets react to CEO turnover announcements by 
considering the turnover process - routine and non-routine. The findings indicate that there is no difference between 
the trading volume 10 days before and 10 days after the events. This result suggests that the market does not use this 
information to make investment decisions.  
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The market also did not use the information about the origin of successor when the CEO turnover 
announcements were released. There is no significant difference between the trading volumes within the 21 days 
around the announcements. When the authors combine the contextual factors, there are no significant results. The 
results show that the market did not react to CEO turnover announcements without confounding effects; therefore, 
there is no difference between trading volume 10 days before and 10 days after CEO turnover announcements. 
 
 From Table 2, the test results on comparison between the trading volumes 20 days before and 20 days after 
the announcements are in line with the results using a 21-day window period (i.e., trading volume 10 days before 
and 10 days after the announcements). There is no significant difference in the trading volume for all the tests. The 
finding that markets do not react to the CEO turnover announcement implies that investors are not making 
investment decisions upon the release of such information. The market also does not react differently to CEO 
turnover announcements when the turnover process and the origin of successor are being compared. The results also 
show that there is no significant difference between the trading volumes 20 days before and 20 after the 
announcements when the authors examine the following contextual factors: 1) routine inside turnover, 2) routine 
outside turnover, 3) non-routine inside turnover, and 4) non-routine outside turnover. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The results of analyzing of the market reactions to CEO turnover announcements without confounding 
effects using a trading volume approach show that there is no market reaction toward the announcements. The result 
shows that markets do not rely on the release of such information for investment decisions. The result supports 
Reinganum (1985) and Warner, et al. (1988) who found that there is no abnormal return around the turnover 
announcements date. However, this result is contradictory to Charitou, et al. (2010), Cools and van Praag (2007), 
Dahya and McConnell (2005), Dedman and Lin (2002), Denis and Denis (1995), Huson, et al. (2003), Kang and 
Shivdasani (1996), Suchard, et al. (2001), and Weisbach (1988), which show that there are significant abnormal 
returns around the announcement dates. This result does not support Setiawan (2008) which shows that there is 
significant abnormal return around the announcement date. This means Indonesian investors react to the CEO 
turnover announcements in the form of change in the share price, but the transaction volumes are not significantly 
different.  
 
However, when the authors examine the sample with confounding effects, a significant difference is noted 
between the trading volumes between 20 days before and 20 days after the announcements. The results show that 
CEO turnover with confounding effects contains useful information content; therefore, the market reacts. The 
authors also find that markets react to non-routine turnover CEO announcements. When the authors combine both 
contextual factors - turnover process and origin of the successor - there is significant market reaction to the non-
routine outside CEO turnover. The market perceives that non-routine turnover needs an outside successor to enhance 
the firms’ performance. The results also indicate that the market takes longer to react to CEO turnover 
announcements. This result supports previous research by Setiawan (2007, 2008) which found that markets reacted 
significantly when the process of turnover and the origin of incoming CEO were taken into consideration.  
 
The results suggest that Indonesian investors consider all confounding events; for instance, micro-events 
such as dividends, earnings, and other information released around the CEO turnover announcements, to make 
investment decisions. These results support Lako (2002) and Graffin, et al. (2011) who argued that investors 
consider other corporate actions to make investment decisions.  
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